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SOME ABCS OF FEMINIST SEX EDUCATION 
(IN LIGHT OF THE SEXUALITY CRITIQUE OF 
LEGAL FEMINISM)  
 
LINDA C. MCCLAIN* 
 
This Essay has two aims. First, it offers some guiding principles, or 
“ABCs,” for a feminist vision of sex education. Second, in keeping with 
this symposium’s topic, “Sexuality and the Law,” the Essay evaluates that 
feminist project in light of what I call “the sexuality critique” of legal 
feminism—a line of criticism leveled by feminist and post-feminist scholars 
against feminist legal theorists’ work on sexuality. The ABCs advanced 
here reflect a liberal feminist approach to sex education, which stresses the 
three themes of fostering capacity, equality, and responsibility.  Such an 
approach, the Essay maintains, is better suited for facilitating the 
development of young women’s and men’s capacities for responsible sexual 
self-government than the abstinence-until-marriage model of sex education 
(“abstinence-only”) embraced in the federal welfare law codified as the 
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996.1 
“Abstinence-only” sex education reflects a conservative sexual economy. 
As put into practice in various curricula funded by the federal government, 
such sex education is laden with gender role stereotypes about “his” and 
“her” sexuality that reinforce women’s role as sexual gatekeepers.2   
This Essay, given the constraints of space, presents a condensed 
account of a basic liberal feminist framework for sex education and 
contrasts such a framework with the conservative sexual economy of 
“abstinence-only” sex education.3 For this symposium, I will address the 
                                                 
* Rivkin Radler Distinguished Professor of Law, Hofstra University School of 
Law. B.A., Oberlin College; M.A., University of Chicago Divinity School; J.D., Georgetown 
University Law Center; L.L.M., New York University School of Law. I am grateful to 
Hofstra Law School reference librarian Cindie Leigh and to my research assistant Krista 
Smokowski for valuable help with research. Thanks also to Kathy Abrams, Mary Anne Case, 
James Fleming, James Garland, Tracy Higgins, Carlin Meyer, and Cheryl Mwaria for 
discussion of some of the ideas in this Essay. 
1 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 710, 702-03, 705-08 (2000). 
2 See discussion infra Part I. 
3 For a fuller elaboration of an approach to sex education that moves “beyond 
women as gatekeepers,” please refer to LINDA C. MCCLAIN, THE PLACE OF FAMILIES: 
FOSTERING CAPACITY, EQUALITY, AND RESPONSIBILITY 256-89 (2006). 
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following issue: what implications for sex education—and in particular, 
feminist frameworks for sex education—grow out of the sexuality critique? 
The gist of this critique, leveled by feminist and post-feminist scholars 
against feminist legal work on sexuality, is that feminist legal theory 
analyzes sexuality as a site of subordination of and harm to women. As a 
consequence, such theory calls for and embraces legal regulation, protection, 
and remedy aimed at such harm, but abdicates to others the task of 
developing a positive account of sexuality.  
Situating her critique as one lodged within legal feminism, 
Katherine Franke charges that legal feminists have failed to “theorize 
‘yes,’” and instead have reduced sexuality either to dependency (that is, 
reproduction, mothering, and caregiving) or to danger (that is, sexual 
subordination and sexual harm).4  
Stepping outside of feminism, Janet Halley, in a series of writings, 
argues that it would be beneficial to those doing “left pro-sex intellectual 
and political work,” including feminists, to “Take a Break from 
Feminism.”5 Like Franke, Halley divides legal feminists into those who 
focus on “reproduction, care work, work in the paid economy, and related 
matters,” and those who concern themselves with “male power and female 
subordination in sexuality.”6 Feminism’s commitment to viewing questions 
of sexuality through the lens of subordination theory, Halley charges, leads 
it to find in every issue, however complex, a basic subordination dynamic in 
which M > F, with men always powerful and women always powerless.7 
But even as feminism has become “governance feminism,” or, in other 
words, has become instantiated in laws addressing such matters as sexual 
harassment, sexual violence, and the like, Halley argues that feminism fails 
to admit its “will to power” or to recognize the costs that “governance 
feminism” imposes on men and other groups.8  
This line of critique further contends that feminist legal theory has 
failed to generate positive accounts of sexuality. Instead, a cluster of 
intellectual and political movements, including “Queer Theory” in 
particular, have challenged the subordination paradigm and taken up this 
                                                 
4 See Katherine M. Franke, Theorizing Yes: An Essay on Feminism, Law, and 
Desire, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 181 (2001). 
5 See Ian Halley, Queer Theory by Men, 11 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 7, 7 
(2004); see also Janet Halley, Sexuality Harassment, in LEFT LEGALISM / LEFT CRITIQUE 80, 
88-89, 94-102 (Wendy Brown & Janet Halley eds., 2002); Janet Halley, Take a Break from 
Feminism?, in GENDER AND HUMAN RIGHTS 57, 65-66 (Karen Knop ed., 2004).   
6 Halley, Queer Theory by Men, supra note 5, at 8. 
7 See id.  
8 See Halley, Take a Break from Feminism?, supra note 5, at 57, 65-66. 
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positive task left undone by feminism.9 Franke and Halley, for example, 
claim that legal feminists seek to sanitize or feminize sex by sharply 
separating the categories of “desire” and “danger,” thus leaching out of 
sexual desire inherent elements of risk and jeopardy.10 Moreover, Halley 
argues that, to the extent legal feminists do offer an affirmative vision of 
sexuality, it is of a problematic “feminine” sexuality.11
In an earlier exchange published in this Journal, Gender, Sexuality, 
and Power: Is Feminist Theory Enough?, Professor Halley engaged in a 
thought-provoking dialogue with Professors Brenda Cossman, Dan 
Danielson, and Tracy Higgins over the question of whether feminism was 
“enough,” in the sense of offering an adequate tool kit to assess matters of 
gender, power, and sexuality.12  In this Essay, I draw on the dialogical 
method, proposed by Cossman, of a “feminism after.” This is a method of 
feminist legal theory that is enriched by engaging with forms of analysis, 
such as “Queer Theory” or Halley’s “Taking A Break from Feminism,” that 
do not share feminism’s unrelenting focus on gender and the male/female 
dynamic. However, “feminism after” such a critique, Cossman contends, 
still has a distinct and valuable perspective to offer by training a gender lens 
on matters of sexuality.13 Thus, in this Essay, I consider how analyses of 
intimacy and sexuality, arising outside of legal feminism, would critique 
and enrich my own analysis. I also ask whether these approaches enrich my 
own critique of the “abstinence-only” model favored by the federal 
government.  
This Essay considers two texts; the first is Intimacy, an anthology 
edited by Lauren Berlant,14 which reflects a variety of critical perspectives, 
including Queer Theory. I note some striking convergences and divergences 
between the sharp critique, in several essays in that anthology, of the 
institutions of intimacy and of the human toll exacted by channeling men 
and women into marriage in the service of orderly social reproduction and 
the vision of marriage apparent in the conservative sexual economy. I also 
                                                 
9 See Franke, supra note 4, at 182-83; Halley, Queer Theory by Men, supra note 5, 
at 13-14. 
10 See Franke, supra note 4, at 182-83; Halley, Sexuality Harassment, supra note 5, 
at 88-89, 94-102 (discussing the “problematic of wantedness”).  
11 See Janet Halley, The Politics of Injury: A Review of Robin West’s Caring for 
Justice, 1 UNBOUND 65, 70-71 (2005), available at 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/students/orgs/unbound/index.php [hereinafter The Politics of 
Injury]. 
12 See Brenda Cossman et al., Gender, Sexuality, and Power: Is Feminist Theory 
Enough?, 12 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 601 (2004) [hereinafter Gender, Sexuality, and Power]. 
13 See id. at 618-24. 
14 See INTIMACY (Lauren Berlant ed., 2000). 
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raise some questions about how a liberal feminist approach to social 
reproduction might mediate between these two stark positions. I then 
engage with Halley’s recently published review of Robin West’s book 
Caring for Justice, in which Halley critiques West’s articulation of a 
“redemptive” “feminine” sexuality.15 I choose this particular writing by 
Halley because I have also reviewed West’s book 16  and can therefore 
readily compare my liberal feminist critique of West’s vision of sexuality 
with that of Halley. I defend the gender lens of my own approach, noting 
some problematic aspects of Halley’s critique, but also conclude that 
Halley’s analysis fruitfully opens avenues for further inquiry about 
sexuality and sex education. I conclude by raising some questions (for a 
more complete airing at the live symposium) about how to address the 
challenge of developing feminist conceptions of the place of intimacy, 
sexuality, and family that may compete with the vision manifest in the 
conservative sexual economy. 
I. CONSERVATIVE VERSUS FEMINIST ABCS OF SEX 
EDUCATION 
The “abstinence-until-marriage” model of sex education reflects the 
triumph of a conservative sexual economy: a cluster of ideas about the 
proper arrangement of sexuality that seeks to revive and fortify what are 
claimed to be traditional moral values and social norms.17 On this view, 
young people should be sexually abstinent until marriage. Courtship, rather 
than dating, is the pathway to marriage. A critical component of the model 
is that girls and women are gatekeepers; they are responsible for the proper 
regulation of boys’ and men’s sexuality. In this vision, men and women 
differ not only in sexual desire, but in their capacities, needs, and ambitions. 
In the conservative sexual economy, marriage is the only proper 
site for the expression of sexuality. Heterosexual sex within marriage is the 
only normatively acceptable form of sex. Marriage is a necessary institution 
for channeling sexual drives (especially those of men) into the constructive 
social forms of monogamy, reproduction, and parenting. 
                                                 
15 See Halley, The Politics of Injury, supra note 11 (reviewing ROBIN WEST, 
CARING FOR JUSTICE (1997) [hereinafter WEST, CFJ]). 
16  See Linda C. McClain, The Liberal Future of Relational Feminism: Robin 
West’s Caring for Justice, 24 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 477 (1999) [hereinafter The Liberal 
Future]. 
17 The idea of a “conservative sexual economy” is developed in MCCLAIN, supra 
note 3, which offers examples of its operation both in “abstinence-until-marriage” sex 
education, id. at 256-63, 276-81, and in the courtship movement, id. at 281-89. The book 
also argues that the notion of women as gatekeepers, who civilize men through marriage, is 
prominent in the marriage movement. Id. at 135-38. 
2006]  Some ABCs of Feminist Sex Education 67 
 
One conspicuous embodiment of the conservative sexual economy 
is the “Abstinence Education” provisions of the Personal Responsibility and 
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (the “PRWORA”). Congress 
approved federal funding for sex education programs with an “exclusive 
purpose” of teaching abstinence. Among the messages the programs must 
teach are: “abstinence from sexual activity outside marriage [i]s the 
expected standard for all school age children,” “a mutually faithful 
monogamous relationship in the context of marriage is the expected 
standard of human sexual activity,” “sexual activity outside of the context 
of marriage is likely to have harmful psychological and physical effects,” 
and “bearing children out-of-wedlock is likely to have harmful 
consequences for the child, the child’s parents, and society.”18
The governmental embrace of the conservative sexual economy as 
the expected national standard for all citizens conflicts with important 
public values of sex equality, equal concern and respect for all members of 
society (including gay men and lesbians), and respect for reasonable moral 
pluralism. Viewing women as gatekeepers is in tension with viewing them 
as responsible, self-governing persons. This vision of personal 
responsibility places upon women the responsibility for men’s behavior and 
men’s sexuality, even as it insults men’s moral capacity and relieves them 
of responsibility. 
In my recent book, The Place of Families: Fostering Capacity, 
Equality, and Responsibility, I critique this governmental embrace of the 
conservative sexual economy and offer an alternative liberal feminist 
approach to sex education.19 Such an approach builds on the basic premises 
of “abstinence-plus” or comprehensive sex education by combining the 
provision of basic information about sexuality and contraception with clear 
messages about abstaining from sexual activity and deferring pregnancy 
and childrearing until one is emotionally, socially, and financially 
prepared.20 But instead of preaching that any expression of sexual desire 
other than in marriage is contrary to an expected national standard, the 
proposal treats an emerging sense of sexuality and sexual desire as part of 
adolescents’ healthy development and helps them develop a sense of 
themselves as responsible sexual subjects. I take seriously the feminist 
criticism that sex education stresses danger and typically is “missing [a] 
                                                 
18 See 42 U.S.C. § 710 (2000). 
19 The summary of the approach offered in this section of the essay draws upon 
MCCLAIN, supra note 3, at 256-89.  
20 On the effectiveness of such sex education, see DOUGLAS KIRBY, THE NATIONAL 
CAMPAIGN TO PREVENT TEEN PREGNANCY, EMERGING ANSWERS: RESEARCH FINDINGS ON 
PROGRAMS TO REDUCE TEEN PREGNANCY (2001). 
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discourse of desire,” particularly with respect to articulating female 
sexuality.21
Two distinct concerns are at play in sex education: how to instruct 
youths about the place of sexuality in their current lives, and how to prepare 
them for the place of sexuality and reproduction in their adult lives. 
Problems such as teen pregnancy and parenthood, the prevalence among 
teens of sexually transmitted diseases, and pressured as well as coerced 
sexual activity properly lead to a focus upon immediate issues in teens’ 
lives. But a broader view of the aims of sex education would prepare them 
for eventual responsible self-government in their intimate and reproductive 
lives as adults. 
My approach to fostering sexual and reproductive responsibility 
focuses on capacity, equality, and responsibility. It is liberal in emphasizing 
affirmative governmental responsibility to foster children’s capacity for 
eventual self-government and in addressing obstacles to such self-
government. This emphasis on capacity is particularly relevant to 
understanding problems of early sexual activity leading to pregnancy and 
early parenthood. Slogans like “the best contraceptive is a real future” 
express an important point about teen pregnancy, childbirth, and teen 
motherhood and fatherhood. Such behaviors often take place in 
circumstances of economic deprivation, in which a young person’s life 
prospects seem to offer no better option. A firm liberal response is that 
fostering sexual and reproductive responsibility is but one facet of the 
government’s affirmative responsibility to foster the capacities of such 
adolescents. Otherwise, in the words of Dr. Henry Foster, founder of the I 
Have a Future Program, “[w]e are culpable as a society” for not helping 
teens have any other vision for themselves.22  
My approach is also feminist in highlighting that, in addition to 
poverty, sex inequality, gender role expectations, and gender stereotypes 
may stand in the way of adolescents developing capacities for responsible 
self-government and acquiring a sense of personal agency with respect to 
intimacy and sexuality. Problems such as sex inequality, domination, and 
sexual violence, along with cultural constructions of femininity and 
masculinity, constrain young people’s development of a sense of personal 
autonomy and responsibility with respect to sexuality. An adequate program 
on sexuality and sex education should address salient gender issues that 
shape the environment within which girls and boys act and choose. Some of 
those issues include (1) cultural scripts about female and male sexuality that 
                                                 
21 See Michelle Fine, Sexuality, Schooling, and Adolescent Females: The Missing 
Discourse of Desire, 58 HARV. EDUC. REV. 29 (1988). 
22 New Report Details Sexual Trends Among Low-Income Black Urban Youth, 
CAMPAIGN UPDATE 8 (2004), available at 
http://www.teenpregnancy.org/about/announcements/pdf/UpdateSpring2004.pdf (quoting Dr. 
Henry Foster). 
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encourage girls to repress sexual desires and teach boys that male 
irresponsibility, aggression, and entitlement are natural and inevitable; (2) 
the persistence of the sexual double-standard; and (3) approaches to 
sexuality that conflate “sex” with sexual intercourse, thus reinforcing the 
association of desire with danger and hindering the development of a 
broader conception of sexuality that is consonant with developing a sense of 
responsible sexual agency. 
Education about gender issues would help illuminate how gender 
role expectations shape and constrain adolescents’ understandings of 
sexuality and responsibility. Such gender education could be an important 
resource for young people by helping them better develop their capacities 
for responsible sexual agency. As Kathryn Abrams observes, feminist 
analyses of sexuality recognize that, even as women face such constraints as 
coercion and rigid gender scripts, they nonetheless exercise a capacity for 
self-direction and resistance.23 Rigid gender role expectations harm both 
females and males. Men as well as women may be victims of efforts to 
police proper gender role behavior. 24  Notably, legislation introduced in 
Congress for “comprehensive” sex education would include funding for 
education fostering the development of “healthy attitudes and values” about 
“gender roles,” as well as “body image, . . . racial and ethnic diversity, [and] 
sexual orientation.”25 Taking my approach, part of this education would 
include fostering the capacities of young people to recognize, discuss, and 
reflect upon how various cultural and social norms, as well as stereotypes, 
shape ideas about gender roles and the other matters listed above. By 
contrast, one Congressional investigative report of several curricula funded 
under PRWORA found that the representations of male and female 
sexuality, as well as of the relative relationship needs of men and women, 
“present stereotypes as scientific fact.”26 In such models of “his” and “her” 
sexuality, male sexual desire is strong and natural, while female desire is 
more slowly aroused and more cultural; men need little preparation for sex, 
while women may needs hours of “emotional and mental preparation.”27 
                                                 
23 See Kathryn Abrams, Sex Wars Redux: Agency and Coercion in Feminist Legal 
Theory, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 304, 326-29 (1995). 
24 See Katherine M. Franke, What’s Wrong with Sexual Harassment?, 49 STAN. L. 
REV. 691, 693, 696, 759-63 (1997). 
25  See Family Life Education Act, H.R. 768, 109th Cong. § 3(c)(4) (2005); 
Responsible Education About Life Act, S. 368, 109th Cong. § 3(c)(4) (2005). 
26 MINORITY STAFF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS DIV., U.S. HOUSE OF REP., CONTENT 
OF FEDERALLY FUNDED ABSTINENCE ONLY EDUCATION PROGRAMS 16 (2004), available at 
http://www.democrats.reform.house.gov/Documents/20041201102153-50247.pdf.   
27 Id. at 18 (quoting WAIT Training curriculum); see also SIECUS Reviews Fear-
Based, Abstinence-Only-Until-Marriage Curricula, http://www.siecus.org/reviews.html 
(reviewing the Sex Respect curriculum) (last visited Dec. 22, 2005).  
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The gatekeeper role, then, logically falls to girls, who can more easily slow 
things down. But this gatekeeper role, against the backdrop of the sexual 
double standard, exacts a cost both in terms of women not feeling able to 
act on their desire and perceiving themselves as being responsible for male 
desire.   
II. “FEMINISM AFTER” THE SEXUALITY CRITIQUE 
In the dialogue published in this journal, Gender, Sexuality, and 
Power: Is Feminist Theory Enough?, one point of agreement was that, to 
date, feminist legal theory has not risen to the task of imagining or 
envisioning a realm of female sexuality other than that of subordination.28 
Halley contends that one reason is that feminism’s fixation on the 
proposition “M > F” constrains feminists to a grim world in which they 
must discern that subordination on the basis of gender is at the root of every 
problem. 29  Even feminism’s defenders, such as Cossman and Higgins, 
acknowledge that feminism stands to gain if it steps outside itself to 
consider analyses of sexuality that are not constrained by what Halley calls 
feminism’s essentials: a division of the world into male and female, a 
premise of female subordination, and carrying “a brief” for females.30 Like 
Franke and Halley, Cossman and Higgins recognize that there has been an 
outpouring of imaginative work on sexuality being done in other quarters, 
especially the field of Queer Theory. In this section, I concur with Cossman 
and Higgins as to the value of what Cossman describes as “feminism after,” 
feminism enriched by the critique of Queer Theory and other perspectives, 
while “retain[ing] a focus on gender as an axis of power.”31 I now step back 
from my liberal feminist approach to sex education and consider the 
perspectives on sexuality offered in the anthology, Intimacy, and in some of 
Halley’s work. I focus on their positive account of sexuality and on how 
they might critique and enrich my approach to sex education and shed light 
on the conservative sexual economy. 
                                                 
28 See Gender, Sexuality, and Power, supra note 12. 
29 See id. at 604-07 (remarks by Janet Halley). 
30 See id. at 617-18, 623-24 (remarks by Brenda Cossman); id. at 631-36 (remarks 
by Tracy Higgins). 
31 Id. at 618, 623. 
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A. Intimacy as (Problematic) Experience and Institution: The Intimacy 
Collection32  
In Intimacy, a book of essays based on an earlier award-winning 
issue of the journal Critical Inquiry, the editor, Professor Lauren Berlant, 
identifies intimacy as “a special issue” because it implicates both the 
personal (or private) desire for “a life” and the public dimension of 
“institutions of intimacy.” These institutions are frameworks for 
encouraging people to identify “having a life with having an intimate life” 
and for regulating and repressing desire. Intimacy is also “a special issue,” 
Berlant argues, because of “strong ambivalences within the intimate sphere” 
and ambivalences about desire: “utopian, optimism-sustaining versions of 
intimacy” may ill fit the institutions of intimacy that organize people’s lives 
and fantasies of intimate life may encounter “unavoidable troubles, . . . 
distractions and disruptions.”33 Thus, a basic premise of the collection is 
that “[c]ontradictory desires mark the intimacy of daily life,” yet these 
“polar energies” are “seen not as intimacy but as a danger to it.”34
Society, Berlant argues, deals with these ambivalences and 
contradictions by cabining or repressing them. Thus, one life narrative, that 
of the heterosexual (marital) couple, is given primacy by the institutions of 
intimacy. As a result, “desires for intimacy that bypass the couple or the life 
narrative it generates have no alternative plots, let alone few laws and stable 
spaces of culture in which to clarify and to cultivate them.”35  
But even favored institutions of intimacy face the destabilizing 
aspect of desire. Several essays in the collection address the toll taken by 
the task of orderly social reproduction. The essays discuss how organizing 
sexuality into a narrative about marriage and reproduction based around 
heterosexual marital couples can lead to unhappiness, sexual discontent, 
adultery, thwarted desires for communication, and the like.36 These couples, 
the authors contend, long for a greater imaginative space, for better ways to 
envision and live out intimacy. But, as other essays in the volume explore, 
persons whose desires for intimacy do not fit this narrative of the marital 
couple also need such imaginative space. As Berlant puts it, “[t]o rethink 
intimacy is to appraise how we have been and how we live and how we 
might imagine lives that make more sense than the ones so many are 
living.”37  
                                                 
32 See INTIMACY, supra note 14. 
33 Lauren Berlant, Intimacy: A Special Issue, in INTIMACY, supra note 14, at 1-2. 
34 Id. at 5. 
35 Id. 
36 See infra notes 37-55 and accompanying text. 
37 Berlant, supra note 33, at 6. 
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What light does this collection shed on the task of shaping guiding 
principles for sexuality/sex education? How might it critique and enrich my 
own analysis and illuminate the conservative sexual economy? I emphasize 
two themes in the anthology: (1) the cost that orderly social reproduction 
exacts from husbands and wives and how desire and sexuality threaten to 
destabilize this preferred life narrative of the couple, and (2) the “world-
making” project of Queer Theory and its challenge to the project of 
“national heterosexuality.” 
1. The Costs of Orderly Social Reproduction 
The argument that harnessing sexuality in the service of orderly 
social reproduction exacts a cost in terms of personal happiness and 
pleasure is prominent in Berlant’s anthology. Several contributors paint a 
grim picture of marriage and its discontents. Do alternative visions of 
sexuality and freedom underlie these analyses? Are they of use for a 
feminist approach to sexuality and sexuality/sex education?  
A vivid portrait of marital misery and of the wish to imagine 
another world appears in Laura Kipnis’s essay, Adultery.38 She writes: “If 
marriage is society’s container for intimacy, property, children, and libido, 
adultery doubles as its dumpster for all the toxic waste of marital strife and 
unhappiness . . . .”39 Adultery is appealing because it “unravels” the married 
person from the “welter” of “commandments that handcuff inner life to the 
interests of orderly reproduction”; it is “destabilizing” because it involves a 
person “deeply wanting something beyond what all conventional 
institutions of personal life mean for you to want.”40 Adultery seems to 
“allow space for new forms to come into being,” an “unbounded intimacy 
outside contracts, law, and property relations.”41  
Marriage, in Kipnis’ essay, is a dreary, de-eroticized state. She 
refers to the would-be adulterer’s “torpid married body.”42 She scoffs at the 
adage that “good marriages take work,” as though marriage is a “domestic 
factory policed by means of rigid shop-floor discipline designed to keep the 
wives and husbands of the world choke-chained to the reproduction 
machinery.”43 Thus, what staying together “for the sake of the children” 
means in practice, she argues, is “habituating children to contexts of chronic 
                                                 
38 See Laura Kipnis, Adultery, in INTIMACY, supra note 14, at 9. 
39 Id. at 41. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. at 42. 
42 Id. at 9. 
43 Id. at 11. 
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unhappiness and dissatisfaction; to unmet needs as status quo; to bitching 
mothers, remote fathers, and other gendered forms of quotidian misery.”44  
What is the liberatory project that Kipnis proposes as an alternative 
to such misery in the service of social reproduction? It is not clear. Adultery, 
whatever else it is, is “a placeholder for more sustained kinds of 
transformation and honesty.” 45  To envision such alternatives, to install 
“optimism and desire into ordinary life in place of emotional fatigue and 
renunciation,” would require utopian thinking and fantasy.46
Infidelity, one consequence of the strain of orderly social 
reproduction, is also the theme of Michael Hanchard’s essay, Jody. His 
focus is on representations in black popular culture of “Jody,” an “erotic 
scavenger” who “exist[s] at the margins of others’ love relationships” with 
“promises to sate unfulfilled, unquenchable desires.”47 Often, Jody is a man 
who poaches on another man’s wife while he is away from the home 
working to secure material provision for his wife and the household. 
Consequently, Jody upsets the political and sexual economy at work. Under 
conventional views of masculinity (including black masculinity), material 
provision ought to ensure fidelity, respect, and compliance, but the Jody 
figure signifies that wage labor may be at odds with fulfilling erotic 
desires. 48  As such, Hanchard observes, Jody appears to reflect a clash 
between the reality principle (e.g., wage labor, the strain of material 
provision) and the pleasure principle (the desire for intimacy, pleasure). He 
may also be seen as a “referent for certain female desires” or “an outlet for 
satisfaction, frustration, or revenge,” depending on his female partner’s 
situation.49
 A third essay, Sex and Talk, written by Candace Vogler, speaks of 
the strain of orderly social reproduction, not in the form of adultery, but 
instead in terms of the diverging paths husbands and wives follow in pursuit 
of a common end.50 That end is depersonalized intimacy, intimacy that is 
self-forgetting or self-shattering. Focusing on accounts of unhappy wives 
and husbands in popular American psychology books, Vogler observes that 
the consumers (predominantly female) of such books are the “moral 
proletariat” of “exemplary U.S. heterosexuality,” “charged with producing 
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47 Michael Hanchard, Jody, in INTIMACY, supra note 14, at 193, 193-95. 
48 See id. at 193-206. 
49 Id. at 217. 
50 See Candace Vogler, Sex and Talk, in INTIMACY, supra note 14, at 48. 
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exemplary heterosexual intimacy at home and managing family values for 
children.” 51  What are the “gender-typical heterosexual complaints” this 
literature reveals? “[C]ase-study wives complain that their husbands won’t 
talk, and case-study husbands complain that their wives won’t have sex.”52 I 
will not recount all the steps in Vogler’s analysis, but she concludes that 
husbands actually seek “refuge from the burdens of heterosexual masculine 
selfhood” in the form of “depersonalizing” sex with their wives, “a mode of 
intercourse at home that does some violence to their senses of themselves as 
husbands, fathers, heads of household, authorities, and so on.”53 But if 
husbands feel safer having sex than talking, wives seek in talk a safe “self-
forgetfulness”; they seek “the sort of intimacy with their husbands that they 
get from talk with other women,” often called “troubles talk,” “the sort that 
allows one to forget who one is for a little while.”54 Vogler’s concluding 
prescription for such husbands and wives is “[t]o imagine intimacies that 
are neither entirely self-expressive nor strictly self-disrupting.”55
2. The “World-Making” Project of Queer Theory 
Some essays in the Intimacy anthology challenge 
“heteronormativity” and would decenter the heterosexual couple to open up 
space for a broader realm of sexuality. In a provocatively-titled essay, Sex 
in Public, Lauren Berlant and Michael Warner speak of the “radical 
aspirations of queer culture building,” which include “the changed 
possibilities of identity, intelligibility, publics, culture, and sex that appear 
when the heterosexual couple is no longer the referent or the privileged 
example of sexual culture.”56 They identify a “core national culture” of 
“national heterosexuality,” or “a sanitized space of sentimental feeling and 
immaculate behavior, a space of pure citizenship.”57
If sexuality is a central focus of certain strands of feminism, namely 
dominance feminism, out of a conviction that sexuality is the foremost site 
of women’s subordination, sexuality is, for Queer Theory, “an inescapable 
category of analysis [and] agitation,” but for a different reason. Berlant and 
Warner argue that sexuality is a central focus because of its role in 
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heteronormativity. They argue that “heteronormativity” is “a fundamental 
motor of social organization in the United States, a founding condition of 
unequal and exploitative relations throughout even straight society.”58
To the criticism that they put forth a “radical anti-normativity” that 
fails to allow for, or envision, ordinary life, Berlant and Warner respond 
that “to be against heteronormativity is not to be against norms” and is not 
to repudiate family and children. Rather, their concern is that “the space of 
sexual culture has become obnoxiously cramped from doing the work of 
maintaining a normal metaculture.”59 Social membership is not available 
unless persons can identify with “the heterosexual life narrative.”60 A queer 
world-making project would disrupt this life narrative and offer different 
visions of intimacy, sexuality, and a good life.  
The “world-making project” that Berlant and Warner describe 
poses challenges to a heteronormative vision of intimacy that confines 
sexuality to—or, perhaps even better, harnesses it in service of—orderly 
social reproduction. Instead of relegating the sexual and the erotic to the 
private, to the family, and to reproduction, it would disrupt this ordering. 
Queer culture, due to both the criminalized and stigmatized status of 
homosexuality in society and the linking of the institutions of social 
reproduction to the forms of hetero culture, has had to develop “kinds of 
intimacy that bear no necessary relation to domestic space, to kinship, to the 
couple form, to property, or to the nation.”61 They point out the fundamental 
inequality that is part and parcel of heteronormativity: “Heteronormative 
forms of intimacy are supported . . . not only by overt referential discourse 
such as love plots and sentimentality but materially, in marriage and family 
law, in the architecture of the domestic, in the zoning of work and 
politics.”62 By contrast, “[q]ueer culture . . . has almost no institutional 
matrix for its counterintimacies.”63
Some proponents of equality for gay men and lesbians might move 
from this diagnosis of inequality to advocacy for opening up the 
institutional forms that foster orderly social reproduction to gay men and 
lesbians: marriage, family life, the rights and responsibilities of parenting, 
and the like. Not Berlant and Warner. They seek a more fundamental 
transformation of intimacy, not merely “to destigmatize those average 
intimacies [of gay and lesbian couples], not just to give access to the 
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sentimentality of the couple for persons of the same sex, and definitely not 
to certify as properly private the personal lives of gays and lesbians.”64  
Berlant’s and Warner’s picture of heteronormativity and the 
contrasting queer culture suggest that a queer counterpublic holds promise 
not only for gay men and lesbians but also for straights. For example, they 
note that when a heterosexual couple, whose lives are otherwise governed 
by “reproductivity,” can take an interest in sex toys “and other forms of 
nonreproductive eroticism,” they are engaging in “queer sex practices” and 
“their bodies have become disorganized and exciting to them.”65 By this, I 
infer that the authors mean “disorganized” in the sense of temporarily taken 
out of the service of orderly social reproduction and put into the service of 
pleasure, that is, eroticism that is not simply instrumental to reproduction. 
On this broad reading of “queer sex practices,” many heterosexual 
Americans do engage in such practices, if the recent government sex survey 
reporting rates of intercourse using condoms, oral sex, and anal sex are any 
indication.66
3. Sex Education “After” Critiques of Intimacy 
Examining the Intimacy reader and, in particular, essays like that 
written by Kipnis, which paint a bleak picture of how uneasily the 
institution of marriage harnesses sexuality in the service of social 
reproduction, provides an additional perspective from which to assess the 
conservative sexual economy’s vision of marriage as necessary to channel 
otherwise unruly heterosexuality. Indeed, parallels between Kipnis’s 
portrait of the fragile state of marriage and certain contemporary arguments 
made in favor of marriage promotion and of a constitutional federal 
marriage protection amendment that would define marriage, throughout the 
United States, as the union of a man and a woman, are striking. Marriage 
needs protection, its defenders argue, because the bond between men and 
women, although natural, is fragile. Allowing same-sex marriage, the 
argument runs, could weaken marriage’s tight nexus between heterosexual 
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sex, on the one hand, and procreation and parenting, on the other, so that 
marriage seems unnecessary.67  
The notion that marriage is a struggle comes through strongly in the 
recent report from the Council on Family Law, The Future of Family Law: 
Law and the Marriage Crisis in North America, which was co-sponsored by 
the Institute for American Values.68 Marriage, as envisioned in this report, 
is agonistic and “unique” because its main feature is “the attempt to bridge 
sex difference and the struggle with the generative power of opposite-sex 
unions.”69 Marriage as an institution is far more than a close adult personal 
relationship because it encompasses  
fundamental facets of [traditional] human life: the fact of sexual 
difference; the enormous tide of heterosexual desire in human life; 
the procreativity of male-female bonding; the procreativity of 
heterosexual bonding, the unique social ecology of [heterosexual] 
parenting which offers children bonds with their biological 
parents; and the rich genealogical nature of [heterosexual] family 
ties.70
The report stresses both the dangers of unregulated heterosexuality and the 
fragility of marriage. Marriage “addresses the social problem that men and 
women are sexually attracted to each other and that, without any outside 
guidance or social norms, these intense attractions can cause immense 
personal and social damage.”71 The report makes explicit the importance of 
the orderly social reproduction critiqued by Intimacy’s contributors, stating: 
“This mutual attraction is inherently linked to the ‘reproductive labor’ that 
is essential to the intergenerational life of all societies, including modern 
liberal societies.” Without regulation of heterosexuality through “conjugal 
marriage,” the “default position” is “multiple failed relationships and 
millions of fatherless children,” “too many” fatherless children, men 
“abandoning the mothers of their children,” and “women left alone to care 
for their offspring.”72
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Kipnis stresses that the marital yoke rests uneasily: marital 
unhappiness and the “torpor” of the marital body may lead spouses to turn 
to third parties, thus threatening the fidelity norm for marriage. Her essay 
seems to be an indictment of the constraints of the marital form and a call to 
open up space to imagine forms of intimacy not so at odds with erotic 
happiness. Marriage defenders contend that marriage is a worthy social 
institution that secures happiness, health, and well-being, but argue that 
society must shore it up and support it. For example, they oppose expanding 
its definition to include same-sex unions, lest this send a message to 
heterosexuals that marriage has “nothing to do” with procreation and 
children.73  
The liberal feminist approach to sex education that I support 
embraces neither the agonistic vision of marriage articulated by marriage 
defenders nor Kipnis’s grim picture of Eros compromised for the sake of 
conscripting husbands and wives into national service for the cause of 
social reproduction. Rather, my premise is that sex/sexuality education 
stressing themes of capacity, equality, and responsibility aids in helping 
people form and sustain, as part of their view of a good life, relationships 
embodying mutual agency, desire, and responsibility. Here, a feminist focus 
on the lingering hold of gender scripts and gender ideology upon males’ and 
females’ development as sexual subjects may help to lessen the “toll” 
exacted by orderly social reproduction. Developing the capacities of 
children and adolescents to respect and communicate with each other, rather 
than viewing the “opposite” sex as fundamentally alien, may help them 
develop friendships and prepare them for intimacy. Marital happiness, 
particularly for women, bears a relationship to the quality of marriage. As I 
elaborate elsewhere, one important component of this is equality, in the 
sense of a fair and equal, mutual partnership, rather than an unfair and 
hierarchical relationship.74  Moreover, a curriculum that does not exclude 
gay and lesbian adolescents and adolescents sorting out their sexual identity 
could help all students reflect on what values they believe are important to 
personal relationships. Of course, my support of a role for schools in 
encouraging reflection on values as part of sex education should not 
obscure that parents, families, and other institutions of civil society play an 
important role in shaping children’s and adolescents’ values and in 
developing their capacities. 
Sexual ethics—even apart from how it bears on sex education—is 
also a salient subject for adults. What sort of sexual ethics might address 
some of the discontent and unhappiness alleged by critics of “national 
heterosexuality”? Pondering the substance of a “gay and lesbian sexual 
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ethic,” Carlos Ball identifies values of openness, mutuality, and pleasure, 
but adds that, because many heterosexuals also emphasize those values, 
they could form the foundation of a progressive sexual ethic.75 Ball, who 
supports same-sex marriage, argues that, in addition to committed 
relationships, other forms of mutual sexual relationships could have ethical 
value.76 Further, some scholars, such as Elizabeth Emens, argue that there 
could be ethical alternatives to monogamy and that, given the gap between 
the ideal and practice of monogamy (vividly sketched by Kipnis), 
governmental regulation should not preclude people from exploring such 
alternatives as polyamory.77   
This Essay will not take up Emens’ specific argument, but simply 
notes that one issue such an argument attempts to put on the table is 
whether tensions over monogamy warrant a fundamental reconsideration of 
its privileged place in the legal system. Even putting this issue on the table 
might be a way—as Halley has argued—to shift the focus from gender 
subordination as the most salient dynamic in heterosexual marriage to the 
tensions arising from the regulatory power of the marital monogamy norm 
and how, because of this norm, spouses wield “an amazing power over each 
other” to “perform” and “prohibit” infidelity.78 One might further argue that, 
because infidelity and extramarital affairs are a frequent reason for divorce, 
monogamy is an unrealistic ideal. On the other hand, recent state-wide 
surveys on attitudes about marriage and divorce found that both men and 
women reported that, by far, the most frequent reason given for divorce—
even more frequent than adultery—is “lack of commitment.”79   Does it 
follow logically that we should dispense with marital commitment as an 
unrealistic ideal? Or did Massachusetts’s highest court have it right (in 
opening up marriage to same-sex couples) when it stated that “it is the 
exclusive and permanent commitment of the marriage partners to one 
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another, not the begetting of children, that is the sine qua non of civil 
marriage?” 80  There is a liberatory and anti-institutional strain in the 
Intimacy anthology, a vision of desire as inevitably dulled and deadened by 
duty owed by spouses and parents. A powerful counterargument is that only 
by foreclosing infinite possibility in favor of making a commitment to a 
specific person, toward whom one develops loyalty and responsibility, is 
genuine intimacy possible.81  Moreover, the stark picture of orderly social 
reproduction and the war between the reality principle and the pleasure 
principle leaves out the personal and social goods growing out of family life.   
The theme in the Intimacy collection of “national heterosexuality” 
or “exemplary heterosexuality” also enriches analysis of the “expected 
national standard,” set forth in the PRWORA, of abstinence from all sexual 
activity until marriage. Berlant and Warner’s observation about the absence 
of normative institutional frameworks for any form of life other than the 
heteronormative script of the marital couple also helps fortify the point that 
abstinence-only-until-marriage leaves no room for imagining or validating 
lives where desire for intimacy flows toward other life narratives. For 
example, gay men, lesbians, bisexuals, and transgendered young people 
continue to experience difficulty developing a healthy sense of selfhood and 
identity amidst problems of discrimination and invisibility in high school.82 
A majority of parents, however, want teachers to talk about homosexuality 
(albeit without taking a stand about whether it is acceptable or wrong).83 It 
is encouraging that some public schools do include education about 
homosexuality and/or about accepting gays and lesbians and that a growing 
number of high schools have after-school clubs (gay-straight alliances) that 
bring gay and gay-friendly straight students together. 84  Both of these 
developments, however, are targets of conservative groups.85 Sex education 
that reinforces a marital, heterosexual national standard leaves out 
alternative life scripts. As I argue elsewhere, a regulatory framework that 
supports same-sex marriage as well as a kinship registration system for 
other forms of committed intimate relationships (whether or not they 
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included sexual intimacy) would affirm persons’ capacities to form and 
establish the terms of relationships, promote equality among families, and 
foster responsibility and interdependency by linking relational 
responsibilities to rights.86   
B. Janet Halley’s Critique of Robin West’s “Feminine” Sexuality 
Halley observes that, in West’s book, Caring for Justice, 
“patriarchy operates by harming women on every conceivable dimension 
but especially in sexuality and reproduction.” 87  Women suffer various 
“harms of invasion” (West’s term), which, as Halley characterizes the 
argument, “cut women off from themselves; make it impossible for them to 
align desire, pleasure, and action.”88 Although West shares MacKinnon’s 
diagnosis of the centrality of sexuality to women’s subordination, she, 
unlike MacKinnon, also offers a positive vision of sexuality, or, as Halley 
puts it, a redemptive vision of women’s sexual virtue. West (following 
Adrienne Rich) derives this “entirely feminine sexual ethics,” Halley 
contends, from the intimate bonds between girls and their mothers and 
among girls. Patriarchy thwarts these intimate bonds. Quoting West, Halley 
writes that “a young girl’s natural, early, fierce, loving, erotic and caring 
identification with women and girls is shattered by the pervasive patriarchal 
institution of compulsory heterosexuality.”89  
 Halley contrasts the trajectories West paints for male and female 
sexual development: as boys enter manhood, they enter a realm of safety 
and “state-created and law-created equality,” while “a girl entering 
adulthood leaves behind the relative calm, placidity, and equality of young 
female companionship and enters a state-created world of sexual 
vulnerability and radical inequality.”90 West, Halley contends, shows little 
interest in the harms men may suffer. In this worldview, men are phallic 
and powerful, while women, their diametric opposites, have selves 
wounded by patriarchy.91 This diametricality illustrates what Halley calls 
the “Injury Triad”: “female injury + female innocence + male immunity.”92
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How, then, does redemptive female sexuality emerge? For West, on 
Halley’s view, it stems from replacing patriarchal sexuality with a 
“feminine” sexuality, rooted in a safe haven of girlhood and female-female 
intimacy that is “original, innocent, mutual, sharing, giving, affirming.”93 
Noting West’s quotation from Luce Irigiray’s This Sex which is Not One, 
which reads “[e]rection is no business of ours . . . . Don’t make yourself 
erect, you’ll leave us,” Halley characterizes West’s vision both as one of a 
“lesbian sensibility, and an entirely feminine sexual ethics.” 94  West’s 
cultural feminism, thus, “has a sexual ethics for everybody, derived from 
women’s vital, infantile and generative sexual experience:” Indeed, 
The naive expressiveness of the aboriginal self, the erotic 
disposition to give and receive in mutuality, the happy 
embodiedness of the un[a]shamed female form and of the idyllic 
symbiosis originally experienced by mother and daughter—this is 
the stuff of ethically good sex. It’s got everything that the 
invasive harms would erase. And if everyone had sex this way, 
the invasive harms would disappear from the face of the earth.95
What’s wrong with this picture? For one thing, Halley contends, it 
has a feature “widely characteristic of feminist legal theory today and 
highly puzzling if not downright inexplicable: a pervasive lack of interest in 
women’s erotic yearning for men and a foreclosure of theoretic space for an 
affirmation of men’s erotic yearning for them.”96 This feature is “puzzling” 
given that many of the “chief producers” of U.S. feminism are “women 
with husbands, women with boyfriends, women who have sex with men, 
and women with sons,” yet they fail to articulate or understand “women’s 
heterosexual desire for masculinity in men.” 97  Why, Halley asks, have 
cultural feminists (and those other theorists who embrace these concepts) 
“not been asked to explain how they can excuse or affirm precisely the male 
desire which they do desire, and why so many feminists who interdict it 
ethically seem to keep going back for more of it?”98
West’s vision of sexuality in Caring for Justice seems to reflect a 
shift from a more nuanced reading of women’s desires and experiences to a 
view of the “structural subordination of women in heterosexual sexuality.”99 
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In her often-discussed earlier writing about women’s “hedonic lives,” West 
grappled with how to account for some women’s reports of finding pleasure 
in erotic domination by men. She proposed to distinguish problematic cases 
when such pleasures were rooted in fear from those in which they were 
rooted in trust.100 Halley concludes that, in Caring for Justice, West not 
only “maps female sexuality” in a way that omits the possibility of this 
form of trust, but also omits “any happy heterosexuality for women,” 
leaving women with two options: either “an endless sojourn in 
heterosexuality under the ubiquitous conditions of patriarchal threat” or 
women’s “infantile, lesbian, entirely feminine sexuality—a sexuality of 
mutuality, reciprocity, self-affirming integrity, naive embodiment, empathy 
and care.”101 Such feminine sexuality, as Halley interprets West, is the 
“fount” of women’s moral virtue and “the source of their authority to 
rule.” 102  Translated into legal reform, this feminist governance project 
would simply instantiate this feminine sexuality at the expense of other 
conceptions of sexuality. 
C. Feminist Sex Education “After” Halley’s Critique of “Feminine 
Sexuality” 
What has engaging with Halley’s critique of West taught me about 
my own approach to sex education? First, I did not need to “Take a Break 
From Feminism” to find that West’s depiction of how women, constrained 
by patriarchy, turn themselves into “giving selves” is too categorical and 
leaves insufficient room for women’s agency. But my review of West gives 
more credence to her diagnosis of harm than does Halley. Thus, in my own 
review of Caring for Justice, I observed that West’s account “certainly gets 
something right in suggesting a constitutive role played by fear in women’s 
lives; it is undeniable that sexual violence continues to pose a serious 
problem to women’s well-being and ability to act as sexual subjects.”103 I 
further observed that: 
West’s claims that young girls and women take the further step of 
managing that fear by becoming giving selves are too general and 
unqualified. . . . What is missing in West’s account of sexuality is 
the dialectic, spoken of in earlier feminist work on women’s 
quest for sexual liberation, between pleasure and danger: that is, 
the insight that sexual pleasure is an important component of 
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women’s liberation and self-determination, but that negotiating 
sexual pleasure can be a source of danger, not only because of the 
reality of men’s sexual violence but also because of norms and 
stereotypes denying that “good” women should or can enjoy sex. 
 
A central theme in West’s work is bringing women’s narratives 
into the open to gain a better understanding of their hedonic 
lives. . . . Yet her account of women’s sense of terror, and the 
severing of will and desire from act, seems out of touch with 
contemporary culture, in which heterosexual women and lesbians 
use such media as art, literature, music, and film to express a rich 
range of ideas and emotions about sexuality. These range from 
the seeming embrace of gender ideology of male sexual 
entitlement, to active critique of and anger at such ideology, to 
various forms of subverting and transforming such ideology. . . .  
[R]ather than sweeping claims about fear, a more nuanced 
analysis of how cultural ideology about gender, romance, and 
sexuality shape both adolescent females and males is necessary if 
feminists are to find ways to empower girls and to alter the 
cultural ideology of male entitlement and sexual 
irresponsibility.104
 
Like Halley, I also noted a shift from West’s earlier writing on the 
possibility of a positive account of women’s sexuality to the stark picture 
she presents in Caring for Justice: 
From her earliest work in feminist jurisprudence, West hinted at 
the possibility of a heterosexuality premised on trust, love, and 
pleasure, rather than dominance, fear, and pain. . . . She evidently 
all but abandons such a possibility in Caring for Justice. This is 
discouraging, for it presupposes a monolithic account of women 
as victims instead of a more complex model of the possibility of 
agency amidst constraint and of the many ways in which 
heterosexual women can and do negotiate sexuality and marriage 
to make them better serve women’s well-being. Here, especially, 
West needs to engage more constructively with anti-
essentialism’s call for a more provisional and contextual analysis 
of women’s experience.105  
This assessment of West indicates that it is possible to lodge an internal 
feminist critique about the problems with categorical claims about gender-
based injury. But Halley’s emphases and those of this Essay are, 
concededly, different. While emphasizing the need to recognize and 
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theorize women’s sexual agency, I embrace the feminist goal of challenging 
cultural norms of male sexual entitlement and irresponsibility with a view 
to helping males and females better form themselves as capable and 
responsible sexual subjects. I believe this two-fold focus on female agency 
and male entitlement is appropriate. As gender scholar Michael Kimmel has 
observed, “the sexual gender gap has been closing in recent years, as 
women’s and men’s sexual experiences [have] come to more closely 
resemble one another’s”; however, “[w]omen’s increase in sexual agency, 
revolutionary as it is, has not been accompanied by a decrease in male 
sexual entitlement, nor by a sharp increase in men’s capacity for intimacy 
and emotional connectedness.”106  Halley’s focus is on the erasure in West’s 
account of any positive place for “masculinity” in men. Without knowing 
more about what Halley means by “masculinity,” I cannot say whether she 
would view my own project as similarly advancing a “feminine” sexuality 
at the expense of masculinity. 
But I do find Halley’s notion of the Injury Triad helpful for 
focusing on how assumptions about powerless women run parallel to 
envisioning men as all-powerful and may consequently deter important 
work on men’s hedonic lives. The Injury Triad may deter feminists from 
having any interest in, or affiliation with, “the boy on the playground” and 
his fate.107 In my approach to sex education, I urge attention to how cultural 
scripts about gender roles shape adolescent females’ and males’ self-
understandings. Both adolescent females and males, Kimmel reports, have 
“sexual experiences for reasons other than intimacy and pleasure,” a 
problem he attributes in significant part to pressures and communication 
problems arising out of  “gendered sexual socialization” in which the 
traditional male sexual script stresses pursuit and victory, and the female 
script, controlling the situation and protecting her reputation. 108   But 
Kimmel also notes some striking findings about gender difference: when 
adolescent males had unwanted sexual intercourse, they were more likely 
than females to have done so “because they wanted to get sexual experience, 
wanted something to talk about, or wanted to build up their confidence,” or 
because “they did not want to appear to be homosexual, shy, afraid, or 
unmasculine or unfeminine.”109  
Another useful focus of feminist thinking about sexuality could be 
to assess the narrowing gender gap between women and men and between 
adolescent females and males with respect to heterosexual experience and 
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practices.110  Conversely, feminists might also analyze an apparent gender 
gap between women’s (eleven percent) and men’s (six percent) respective 
rates of sexual experience with same-sex partners and women’s higher rate 
(than men’s) of bisexual and same-sex attraction.111 Halley’s discussion of 
“feminine” sexuality could be illuminating here. One possible reason for 
these differentials is that men were asked about engaging in specific sexual 
practices with a male partner (oral or anal sex). Women, on the other hand, 
were asked a broader question: “[h]ave you ever had any sexual experience 
of any kind with another female?”112 Perhaps, we might glean from Halley, 
this different framing of the questions reflects underlying conceptions of 
feminine sexuality as fundamentally diffuse, emotional, and relational, and 
of masculine sexuality as phallic, specific, and act-oriented.113 Or, as recent 
discussions of the so-called “gay cowboy” film, Brokeback Mountain, 
suggest, the gender gap could reflect the harsh toll that conceptions of 
masculinity take on men’s freedom to develop their sexual identity or 
express sexuality that does not take a heterosexual form. 114  Of course, 
merely knowing the respective rates at which persons engage in particular 
sexual practices does not reveal the interpretation they place on those 
practices or the affective dimensions of sexuality. Halley’s urging attention 
to interpretive frames other than gender may also help here. Thus, after the 
federal government released a recent report on sexual practices of 
adolescents and adults in the United States, some analysts discerned 
generational differences in understandings of intimacy and sexuality, with 
teens differing from adults by viewing oral sex as a less intimate and more 
casual act.115  
Finally, Halley’s contention that feminism fails to offer an account 
of women’s and men’s heterosexual desire is intriguing. Perhaps “Taking a 
Break from Feminism” helped Halley to diagnose this absence. Halley also 
makes a fair point that feminist models of sexuality may champion a 
redemptive “feminine sexuality” that leaves out “the possibly vital and life-
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affirming dimensions of men’s bodily immediacy, phallic drive, and 
aggression.”116 But the way Halley seems to mock, both in the review of 
West discussed here and in her other critiques of feminism, the feminist 
goal of safety in sexuality is troubling. Does it indeed rob sexuality of all its 
force, or channel it into a confining “feminine” form, to aspire to a sexual 
ethic of respect for bodily integrity and of a prohibition against sexual 
assault? When Halley chides feminists for trying to sanitize sex by trying to 
separate desire and danger and by insisting on the distinction between 
wanted and unwanted sex,117 how might this critique translate into a vision 
of sex education? Are there any fundamentals or basic preconditions for 
developing sexual agency in which she might find common ground with 
feminists? Determination of whether there is such common ground between 
feminists and proponents of the sexuality critique would be a valuable path 
of inquiry. For there exists an ironic parallel between remonstrations by 
Franke and Halley about feminists’ efforts to make sex safe and warnings 
by abstinence-only proponents that the only “safe” sex is “saved sex”—sex 
within marriage. Although these pro-sex legal theorists would distance 
themselves from the abstinence champions who loudly proclaim their own 
pro-sex stance, what seems to link them is an underlying vision of powerful 
forces at work that are not easily channeled or disciplined. This Essay 
suggests that feminism, or, perhaps, “feminism after,” has the resources to 
offer a better vision.   
III. CONCLUSION 
This Essay offered some “ABCs” of feminist sex education as a 
counter to the conservative sexual economy reflected in federal funding of 
abstinence-only sex education. A liberal feminist focus on capacity, 
equality, and responsibility would better prepare young people for 
responsible sexual self-government than a “national standard” that treats all 
sexuality outside of heterosexual marriage as dangerous and threatening, 
and curricula that perpetuate gender role stereotypes about women as 
gatekeepers and men as irresponsible. I have also engaged with the 
sexuality critique of legal feminism, which argues that it has failed to 
articulate a positive vision of sexuality that moves beyond conflating 
sexuality with danger. Endorsing the value of a “feminism after” 
constructive engagement with critiques of legal feminism and with other 
theorizing about sexuality, I considered how certain texts about sexuality 
might critique and enrich my own approach to sex education and sexuality 
and shed light on the conservative sexual economy. I noted some striking 
convergences and divergence between the conservative sexual economy and 
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more radical accounts of intimacy with respect to the role played by 
marriage in containing and confining intimacy in service of orderly social 
reproduction. In doing so, I suggested how a liberal feminist approach to 
social reproduction might mediate between these two stark positions and 
identified fruitful areas for further inquiry. 
 
 
